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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Honorable Thomas J. Ryan in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Canyon dated January 19, 2011, in which Appellant was convicted of Manufacturing a 
Controlled Substance under Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a)(l)(B). 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below 
An application for a search warrant to search Appellant's residence was made on or about 
July 6, 2010, and subsequently granted and executed that same date. R Vol. I, pp. 67-72. A 
Criminal Complaint was filed on or about July 7, 2010, charging Appellant with the crime of 
Manufacturing A Controlled Substance in violation of Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a)(l)(B). R Vol. I, 
pp. 6-7. An Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence was filed on or about October 22, 2010 
challenging the legality of the search warrant issued on or about July 6. 2010. R Vol. I, pp. 40-
66. Argument was heard on or about November 4, 2010, and the District Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision & Order Upon Appellant's Motion to Suppress on or about November 8, 
2010, upholding the legality of the search warrant. R Vol. I, pp. 93-103. On or about November 
12, 2010, Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty reserving his right to appeal the District 
Court's decision on the Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence. R Vol. I, pp. 106-107. 
Appellant now submits for the Court's consideration this Brief on Appeal. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
On or about July 6, 2010, a seasoned Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (hereinafter "PA") 
and Idaho State Police (hereinafter, "ISP") Detective Jason Cagle (hereinafter, "ISP Cagle") 
made application for search warrant S W2 7 5 3 of the residence located at 115 7 6 Crested Butte in 
Nampa, Idaho (hereinafter, "11576"). R Vol. I, pp. 67-73. The substance of the testimony 
offered under oath in support of the finding of probable cause for the search warrant consisted of 
an anonymous tip corroborated by police observation. 
The only facts in this case are simple and amount to the following: There is a renter 
living at 11576 who has lived there for about one (1) year. Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 24; p. 7 L. 9-11. 
He is only seen when mowing his well-kept green grass. Tr Vol. I, p. 7 L. 11-12. He has a 
couple propane tanks, a couple spare tires, and some sort of burner on his small back concrete 
patio. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 15-18. Also in the back of his house there are two (2) fans mounted in 
the sliding glass window. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 23-24. He employs bright lights in his home and has 
covered a front room window with a non-transparent material. Tr Vol. I, p. 15, L. 25; p. 9, L. 
15-18. He has outdoor lights, advertisements on his front door, and no gardening space in the 
back yard. Tr Vol. I, p. 9, L. 8-14; p. 9, L. 24-25. At some unknown time in his past, he 
obtained three (3) convictions for "marijuana-type crimes" out of Illinois. Tr Vol. I, p. 12, L. 10-
11. He was seen leaving his garage in his red Toyota pickup, which has an MDT computer in it, 
and returning to the same garage where there is so much clutter there is only room for one ( 1) 
vehicle. Tr Vol. I, p. 12, L. 23-24; p. 13, L. 20-21; p. 14, L. 14-19. Lastly, he was observed 
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going to three (3) home-supply stores where he went to the gardening sections and looked at 
items in the fertilizer area. Tr Vol. I, p. 13, L. I p. 14, L. 19. Those are the only facts. 
The Court, however, entertained testimony by ISP Cagle at the direction of the PA which 
consisted of ISP Cagle' s training and experience, the facts as stated above, and a host of 
conjecture and speculation. In fact, before introducing any evidence, the PA spent 
approximately five (5) minutes offering ISP Cagle's training and experience. Tr Vol. I, pp. 2-5. 
During the review of ISP Cagle's training and experience, a considerable portion of that 
time consisted of information as to how marijuana grow operations are routinely set up. Tr Vol. 
I, p. 4, L. 8 - p. 5, L. 22; p. 19, L. 18 p. 20, L. 10. ISP Cagle informed that an indoor 
marijuana grow consists of a watering system and intricate lighting system where grow lights are 
regulated by timers. Tr Vol. I, p. 4, L. 12-19; p. 19, L. 22-23. Those timers set longer lighting 
sessions during a portion of the year and toward the final stages of a grow there are longer 
sessions where the lights are off. Id. ISP Cagle continued to expound that there are usually 
multiple pots in a small room. Tr Vol. I, p. 4, L. 20 p. 5, L. 1. He informed that one could 
have several hundred plants in a small room that are usually in different stages of growth ranging 
from smaller plants clear up to mature plants. He explained that typically a grower will take 
clips from mature plants and plant those clips so there are continually plants at different stages of 
growth. Id. 
ISP Cagle was then directed to expound on the lighting systems used. Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 
2-9. He explained that he has seen different lighting systems but typically a "sodium halide" 
lamp is used which he described as emitting a "bright white light." Id. He then confirmed 
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through questioning by the PA that it is common for marijuana grow operations to incorporate 
common garden materials but in a much larger scale and in a confined environment. Tr Vol. I, p. 
5, L. 13-22. 
After ISP Cagle concluded his detailed description of marijuana grow operations from his 
training and experience, he was directed to tum his attention to information he learned from an 
anonymous tip in regards to 11576. Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 23 - p.8 L. 1. The anonymous tip 
consisted of an unnamed Trooper who informed ISP Cagle about a tip he received from an 
individual who wished to remain anonymous that approximately three (3) to three and a half (3-
1/2) weeks prior the power had gone off in that individual's neighborhood with the exception of 
the house at 11576 where the outside lights remained on. Id. Additionally, the informant 
conveyed that there were some fans on the back door of the residence. Id. ISP Cagle contacted 
the informant and gathered additional information which included facts that the person living at 
11576 had lived there for approximately one (I) year; that the informant hardly ever sees the 
person except when they are outside mowing the lawn; that the informant never sees a car parked 
there; that when it is dark outside, there is a bright light shining out of the windows of the 
residence; and that on one of the windows in the back of the residence, at night they could see a 
bright light which appeared to be suppressed by something covering the window leaving a dark 
silhouette. Id. 
This information inspired further investigation by ISP Cagle. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 2-4. He 
was given permission by area neighbors to view into the back yard of 11576. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 
7-9. He described the back yard as having nothing there. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 14. He stated that 
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the grass was green and freshly mowed and there was a small back patio of concrete. Tr Vol. I, 
p. 8, L. 14-16. There were two (2) or three (3) propane tanks sitting on the back porch, a couple 
of spare tires, and what looked like some kind of burner. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 16-18. ISP Cagle 
indicated that he could see the back screen door and that it incorporated a piece of plywood 
about thirty (30) inches wide that extended from the base to the top of the door with two (2) fans 
custom built into the plywood. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 18-24. 
ISP Cagle stated that he went to the front of the house and knocked on the door to make 
contact and attempt a "knock and talk." Tr Vol. I, p. 9, L. 4-7. He informed that he "could hear 
a fan or some sort of motor nmning inside the house," but nobody answered the door. Id. He 
observed all the outdoor lights were on and that there were cob webs and dead bugs indicating 
they had been on for a long time. Tr Vol. I, p. 9, L. 8-14. There were several notices of 
advertisements hanging from the front door indicating that nobody had accessed that door for 
some time. Id. ISP Cagle then attempted to look in the front window from the sidewalk at the 
door and observed that the blinds were pulled and behind the blinds was some sort of non-
transparent material that looked like aluminum foil. Tr Vol. I, p. 9, L. 15-20. This material 
covered the whole inside of the window inside the screen. Id. ISP Cagle continued to inform 
that he did not observe any gardening space in the back yard. Tr Vol. I, p. 9, L. 23-25. 
ISP Cagle was then redirected to address why he thought the materials on the window 
were related to marijuana production or an indoor grow operation. Tr Vol. I, p. 10, L. 4-15 
(emphasis added). He explained that in a grow operation one wants to control the light coming 
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into his residence and does not want to expose the plants to outside sources of light not regulated 
by the lighting schedule. Id. 
ISP Cagle then infonned that the two (2) fans in the back were mounted in a sliding glass 
door. Tr Vol. I, p. 10, L. 16-18. He instructed that these types of fans are commonly used to 
dissipate odors, moisture, and heat from a residence housing an indoor marijuana grow. Tr Vol. 
I, p. 10, L. 19 - p. 11, L. 2. 
The PA then inquired as to the significance of the number of flyers left on the door. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 11, L. 9-16. ISP Cagle informed that from the training courses he has attended on 
indoor grow operations, he has learned that it is "not always common that people live in the 
residence where they grow their marijuana." Id. He articulated that the flyers indicated the 
resident is not there or "not accessing that door for a variety o.freasons." Id. (emphasis added). 
ISP Cagle informed that based upon his training and experience, indoor marijuana grows 
routinely happen with leased premises instead of O\\>ned premises. Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 17-20. He 
then confirmed that the person on record at 11576 is a renter and identified Appellant as being 
that renter. Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 21 - p. 12, L. 3. He also informed the court that Appellant's 
criminal record reflects that he has three (3) convictions on his record out of Illinois for 
'·marijuana-type crimes." Tr Vol. I, p. 12, L. 4-11. No further evidence was offered as to how 
long ago those convictions occurred, the exact charges, or the severity of punishment issued 
related to those charges. 
ISP Cagle then informed that he proceeded to set up surveillance at 11576. Tr Vol. I, p. 
12, L. 12-25. The unidentified informant contacted him several times when they observed an 
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individual at the residence, but never saw a vehicle at the residence. Id. On July first, 
surveillance observed a red Toyota pickup driven by Appellant pull out of the garage of the 
residence, and surveillance proceeded to follow Appellant. Id. 
Appellant was followed to Zamzow' s where he appeared to be looking in the fertilizer 
area, talked to some people in the outdoor garden section and then left without purchasing 
anything. Tr Vol. I, p. 13, L. 1-8. Appellant was then followed to Home Depot and then to 
Lowe's. Tr Vol. I, p. 13, L. 9 - p. 14, L. 12. In both of those stores, Appellant was observed 
looking at fertilizer and talking to people, but did not purchase anything at either store. Id. 
Inside of Lowe's, Appellant was also observed looking at starter plant boxes. Id. 
While Appellant was inside of Home Depot, ISP Detective White looked in the back of 
Appellant's pickup and observed what he thought was a forty ( 40) to seventy (70) gallon fuel 
tank lying flat in the bed of the pickup and somewhat "disguised and hidden." Id.; ISP Cagle's 
report, Discovery p. 4, attached to PSI. There were also several pieces of PVC in the bed of the 
pickup. Id. Additionally, the pickup was equipped with a computer, "like an MDT." Id. 
After leaving Lowe's, Appellant sat in his pickup for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes 
where it appeared that he was accessing the computer. Tr Vol. I, p. 14, L. 20 - p. 15, L. 11. 
When asked why this was of import, ISP Cagle started his response with, "[flrom discussing 
with everybody in the office ... " and went on to speculate that he was "probably price 
checking ... perhaps following a recipe ... [p}erhaps didn't have the right name brands," or 
"cross-checking to see name brands and get the right mixtures of things." Id. (emphasis added). 
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ISP Cagle was then asked if he believed Appellant was setting up a grow operation. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 15, L. 12-14 (emphasis added). He responded that in his "opinion ... there is a current 
grow in there and he's either grafting off larger plants or making clones of the plants he does 
have or he's in the initial phases ofit." Tr Vol. I, p. 15, L. 15-18 (emphasis added). When asked 
why he believes that, he responded that he knew it was in a growing phase because "on Sunday 
night, the 4th of July, about midnight, 11 :45, I drove by the residence" and observed a "bright 
light emanating from the front room." Tr Vol. I, p. 15, L. 20 - p. 16, L. 3 ( emphasis added). He 
observed the silhouette of something covering the window and "could see the multi-colors, the 
purples, the blues that are prevalent in those lights." Id. He then indicated he thought the light 
"appeared to be a sodium halide light shining out of the window." Tr Vol. I, p. 16, L. 4-9 
( emphasis added). 
After describing the premises for the Judge, the PA inquired about the fan or other noise 
he heard inside the residence. Tr Vol. I, p. 16, L. 25 - p. 17, L. 7. The PA then asked if it 
"could ... have been something like a generator or some other device to keep the electric power 
on .. " Id. (emphasis added). ISP Cagle dutifully responded, "[i]t's possible, yes." Id. (emphasis 
added). However, ISP Cagle acknowledged that he has never seen a generator or other power 
source used in an indoor grow, but has seen them used in pictures on the internet. Tr Vol. I, p. 
17, L. 8-15. ISP Cagle then, at the direction of the PA, discussed the fact that the fuel tank 
observed in the back of the pickup could be used to fuel a generator. Tr Vol. I, p. 17, L. 16-21. 
At the conclusion of his testimony, the PA strategically directed ISP Cagle to once again 
describe for the Judge "how ... people typically raise indoor plants." Tr Vol. I, p. 19, L. 18-19. 
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ISP Cagle then, again, painted a picture for the Court of an indoor marijuana grow. Tr Vol. I, p. 
19, L. 20 p. 20, 10. He instructed that there are ·'pots or individual containers," a "watering 
system," a "lighting system that they can control," and that they "control the temperature, the 
moisture, the water, the lighting system, everything inside." Id. He continued that there are 
typically plants in different phases including both males and females but that they remove the 
males to keep from pollinating the females. Id. ISP Cagle then once again confirmed his 
opinion that there is a grow operation at 11576 and the Judge granted the search warrant. Tr Vol. 
L p. 20, 11-20. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. IS THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO 
CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE'? 
A. WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY ISP CAGLE CONSISTENT 
ENOUGH WITH HIS TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ABOUT INDOOR 
GROW OPERA TIO NS TO AMOUNT TO A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR 
CONCLUDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO BELIEVE AN 
INDOOR MARIJUANA GROW WAS OCCURRING AT 11576? 
B. DID THE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OFFERED MAKE UP FOR THE 
INCONSISTENCY IN THE EVIDENCE FOUND VERSUS WHAT IS 
EXPECTED TO BE FOUND AT A MARIJUANA GROW OPERATION? 
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ARGt:MENT 
"·The Fourth Amendment protects the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The 'physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."' 
State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466,469, 197 P.3d 327,330 (Ct.App. 2008) citing: United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134 (1972). In Idaho, the 
Fourth Amendment is bolstered by the language of the Constitution of the State of Idaho which 
states in pertinent part, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. 
Idaho Code also specifies that "[a] warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or... by 
testimony under oath and recorded and establishing the grounds for issuing a warrant." I.C.R. 
4l(c). Furthermore, ''the finding of probable cause shall be based upon substantial evidence, 
which may be hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, to believe probable cause exists." Id. 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the "veracity" and '·basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place. 
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Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) citing: Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736 (1960). 
When probable cause to issue a search warrant is called into question, "the duty of a 
reviewing court is ... to ensure that the magistrate had a ·substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' 
that probable cause existed." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 citing: Jones v. United States, 
supra, 362 U.S. at 271, 80 S.Ct. at 736. 
Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to 
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare 
conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review 
the sufficiency of affidavits on which wan-ants are issued. 
Id. The United States Supreme Court goes on to articulate that 
[t]he essential protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, as 
stated in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 
(1948), is in "requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime." 
Id. at 240 citing: Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14, 68 S.Ct. at 369. 
"Probable cause to search requires a nexus between criminal activity and the item to be 
seized, and a nexus between the item to be seized and the place to be searched." State v. Belden, 
148 Idaho 277, 220 P.3d 1096, 1099 (Ct.App.2009) citing: U.S. CONST. amend. IV; State v. 
Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686, 85 P.3d 656, 662 (2004). This "must be established by specific facts, 
and an officer's general conclusions are not enough." Id. Additionally, "there must be some 
facts, in addition to the finding of probable cause that the person has committed a crime, which 
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would support a finding that there is a fair probability that the items sought are in the location 
which the officers seek to search." State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 664, 873 P.2d 891, 898 
(Ct.App. 1993) citing: State v. Sholes, 120 Idaho 639,642,818 P.2d 343,346 (Ct.App.1991). 
"A search conducted pursuant to a warrant which is invalid for lack of probable cause is 
unlawful, and all evidence seized as a result of such a search must be suppressed." State v. 
Molina, 125 Idaho at 639,873 P.2d at 893 citing: State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,528, 716 P.2d 
1288, 1300 (1986). 
I. THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IS INSFFFICIENT TO 
CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The evidence as a whole is short of amounting to "substantial evidence" as required by 
I.C.R. 4l(c) and related case law. The State's evidence amounts to the facts as follows: There is 
a renter who has resided at 11576 for about a year and has two (2) fans in the back sliding glass 
door mounted in ply wood. He has no gardening space in the back yard of his residence but the 
yard is green, nicely mowed, and without clutter. This renter has at some unknown time in the 
past been convicted of three (3) marijuana-type crimes in the State of Illinois. The renter's home 
employs bright lights on the inside. The renter has covered one (1) of several windows with a 
non-transparent material. An ISP Detective observed the renter's bright lights through the 
perimeter of the non-transparent material and made the determination that the light resembled 
sodium halide lights commonly employed for indoor growing. There is a collection of flyers on 
the front door indicating the door is rarely accessed, but there is also a cluttered garage where 
there is space for only one vehicle and likely a house entrance located in the garage. The renter 
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has been observed leaving that garage and returning to the same garage after visiting three (3) 
home supply stores where he visited the gardening section of each and looked at fertilizer and 
other items in each of those stores. The renter did not purchase anything at any of the three (3) 
stores. The renter drives a Toyota pickup with a MDT computer in his truck and has pieces of 
PVC pipe in the back as well as what might be a portable fuel tank. Additionally there is the 
sound of a fan or other motor rwming inside the renter's house that might possibly be a generator 
or some other device that offers a secondary source of energy. 
The State alleged that these facts amount to substantial evidence of an indoor marijuana 
grow operation so as to overcome the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Cnited States 
Constitution and Article t § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. In fact, they have a collection of 
innocent circumstances that have been offered as evidence to support the bare conclusion of an 
"officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Illinois v. Gates, 
462 C.S. at 240. 
This case is analogous to a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals in the 
Fourth Circuit There, the Court applied the exclusionary rule to suppress the finding of 350.5 
grams of cocaine, $6,570 cash, and a digital scale because the innocuous facts offered in support 
of an officer's investigative detention did not amount to the lesser standard of reasonable 
suspicion and '·to do otherwise, would 'invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches." United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 
243, 249 ( 4th Cir. 2011) quoting: Terry v. Ohio, 392 C.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 
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In Foster, the Government argued the investigatory detention was warranted because the 
officer had "prior knowledge of Foster's criminal record," observed "Foster's sudden appearance 
from a crouched position in a parked car, immediately after the driver had apparently said 
something to him after seeing the detective walking towards them," and observed "Foster's 
frenzied arm movements, including the movement of his arms down toward the floor of the car." 
Id. at 246. The Court went on to discuss each of the factors separately before evaluating them in 
total. Id. 
First the Court evaluated knowledge of Foster's criminal record. Id. The Court 
articulated that "an officer's knowledge of a suspect's past arrests or convictions is inadequate to 
furnish reasonable suspicion" and that such knowledge must be paired with "some more 
'concrete factors' to demonstrate that there was a reasonable suspicion of current criminal 
activity." Id. at 247, citing: United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613,617 (4th Cir.1997). In the 
instant case, much like the Foster case, the State points to Appellant's ambiguous and non-
specific criminal history coupled with innocuous facts, not concrete factors, to suggest there is 
ample evidence to meet the higher standard of probable cause to believe there is current criminal 
activity in order to justify violating the sanctity of Appellant's home. 
In Foster, the Court next turned to Foster's sudden appearance in the vehicle. Id. The 
Court recognized that "there are an infinite number of reasonable explanations, unrelated to any 
criminal behavior, to explain why a passenger would not immediately be visible in a car." Id. 
Similarly, in the instant case, there are also a plethora of reasonable explanations 
unrelated to criminal activity for each of the innocuous factors identified. There are bright lights 
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in a home, fans in the back door, a renter who doesn't use the front door much but has been seen 
pulling out of garage where there is probably a house entrance, one (1) of several windows on 
the house have an opaque covering, there is no gardening space but the lawn is green and freshly 
mowed, and the renter drives a work truck with an MDT computer in it and possibly a fuel tank 
in the bed. All of these facts have rational non-criminal explanations, and yet portrayed against 
the backdrop of an officer's "training and experience" and a graphically painted picture of an 
indoor marijuana grow, they are tantamount to probable cause according to the State. 
Finally, the Court addresses Foster's suspicious arm movements. Id. While recognizing 
that evasive behavior may be a "factor in determining reasonable suspicion," the Court 
recognized that "Foster did not try to evade [the officer] ... acknowledged the officer, was not 
noticeably nervous, and did not hastily flee the area." Id. 
In the instant case, Appellant did not have a garden in his back yard, but it is clearly 
established that he is a renter likely unable to make significant alterations to the landlord's 
property. However, there is no evidence of gardening materials at the home in order to make the 
issue of not having a garden in the back yard pertinent. Not a single pot was observed, neither 
was a bag of soil, a bag of fertilizer, a watering system on a timer, lights on a timer, gardening 
gloves, or even a hand shovel. The only evidence of possible gardening supplies was a well kept 
green lawn in July and Appellant merely looking at gardening supplies and fertilizer at three (3) 
different home supply stores. 
The United States Court of Appeals goes on in Foster to articulate several comments 
pertinent to the case at hand: 
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We also note our concern about the inclination of the Government toward using 
whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as indicia of suspicious 
activity. We recognize that we must look to the totality of the circumstances when 
evaluating the reasonableness of a stop. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002). However, an officer and the Government must do 
more than simply label a behavior as "suspicious" to make it so... [E]ven relying 
upon the "experience and specialized training" of the officer, United States v. 
Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.2010), the totality of the circumstances were 
not enough to validate the stop ... Whether considered alone or together these 
factors would have afforded the detective with little more than an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion" that criminal behavior was afoot. Terry. 392 U.S. at 
27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 
Moreover, we are deeply troubled by the way in which the Government attempts 
to spin these largely mundane acts into a web of deception ... [T]he Government 
cannot rely upon post hoc rationalizations to validate those seizures that happen to 
turn up contraband. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565, 96 
S.Ct. 3074. 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (noting that a purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to "prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure"). 
Id. at 248-249. 
Had the State in the instant case offered some "concrete factors" in addition to the 
evidence provided, the evidence might have amounted to probable cause. Perhaps it would have 
been enough had the State offered hearsay evidence that someone had observed marijuana 
growing in the home, evidence that neighbors had smelled marijuana or even seen Appellant 
smoking what looked like a marijuana cigarette, evidence of marijuana plant parts or clippings 
from a trash grab, or even evidence of regular high volume traffic coming to and from the home. 
However, the State offered no evidence of a crime at all. They merely painted a picture of a 
marijuana grow operation and then pointed to some innocent facts as being consistent with, but 
not indicative of, that crime scenario. 
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While the Court in Foster points to United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565, 
96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) to note ·'that a purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
'prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure,"' 
hindsight in this case is a double-edged sword. On one side the State found marijuana growing 
in the residence. On the other side, however, hindsight reveals that the pe1tinent evidence 
offered to justify the abdication of a citizen's Constitutional protections was inaccurate on all the 
significant facts. The lights in the home that were identified by ISP Cagle as '·sodium halide 
lights" in the search warrant testimony based upon his training and experience were actually 
house lights unrelated to any grow operation as the grow operation was contained entirely in a 
homemade closet. ISP Cagle's report, Discovery p. 10, attached to PSI. Likewise, the non-
transparent material covering the window was not employed for the grow operation which, 
again, was in a self-enclosed closet. Id. There was no generator or other source of power 
located in the home. ISP Cagle' s report, Discovery pp. 7-10, attached to PSI. There was no fuel 
tank in the bed of Appellant's truck. Oral Argument Tr Vol. 1, p. 17, L. 21-23; ISP Cagle's 
report, Discovery pp. 7-12, attached to PSI. 1 Also, the fans identified in the back of the house 
were used to dissipate exhaust generated from an elaborate, but legal, indoor beer-brewing 
operation. ISP Cagle' s report, Discovery p. 10, attached to PSI. All in all, the officer's 
conclusory statements about the evidence were speculative and inaccurate. 
1 Despite being arrested out of his truck during the execution of the search warrant. nowhere in the discovery is a 
fuel tank discovered, confiscated, or even mentioned. What the officer observed was an off-the-shelf toolbox by 
Weather Guard installed regularly in the bed of work trucks in order to protect tools and cargo. 
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The State did not meet its burden of showing evidence to support "a substantial basis, 
considering the totality of the circumstances" that probable cause exists. I.C.R. 4 l(c). At best, 
the finding of probable cause was the "mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2332 citing: Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 
271, 80 S.Ct. at 736. The State's evidence should not have resulted in a sanctified "'fishing 
expedition' ... prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." Belden. 220 P.3d at 1100. 
A. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY ISP CAGLE WAS NOT CONSISTENT 
ENOUGH WITH HIS TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ABOUT INDOOR 
GROW OPERATIONS TO AMOUNT TO A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR 
CONCLUDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO BELIEVE AN 
INDOOR MARL.JUANA GROW WAS OCCURRING AT 11576. 
ISP Cagle spent a significant amount of time testifying to the extent of his knowledge and 
experience with indoor and outdoor marijuana grow operations to bolster the finding of probable 
cause to search 11576. He informed the court that an indoor marijuana grow requires a watering 
system. Tr Vol. L p. 4, L. 12: p. 19, 21-25. However, he offers no evidence of a watering 
system at 11576 or even increased use of water at the residence to suggest the use of a watering 
system. 
ISP Cagle indicated that an intricate lighting system would be employed where grow 
lights are regulated by timers. Tr Vol. I, p. 4, L. 13-19; p. 5, L. 2-9; p. 10. L. 7; p. 19, L. 23; p. 
20 L. 1. No evidence, however, was offered that the lighting in the house was on any sort of 
timer. There is no testimony that an officer, during any surveillance, observed lights coming on 
or going off on their own while the home was unoccupied. There was also no observation by 
officers or testimony of observations from the anonymous informant or other neighbors that 
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lights in the house had been observed going on and off at regular times. There was absolutely no 
evidence that a time-regulated lighting system, which is an integral part of an indoor grow 
according to the officer's training and experience. was employed at 11576. 
ISP Cagle also explained that he has seen different lighting systems used, but typically a 
·'sodium halide" lamp is employed which he describes as "multi-color" and emitting a "bright 
white light.'" Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 2-9. Later in his testimony, he indicated that he "know[s]" there 
is currently a grow in progress because "on Sunday night, the fourth of July," at 11 :45 pm when 
much of America is awake and celebrating he drove by the residence and observed a bright light 
emanating from the front room. Tr Vol. I, p. 15, L. 20-23. That light, he stated, which he 
observed around the silhouette of something covering the window, was allegedly consistent with 
a sodium halide light emitting the "multi-colors, the purples, the blues that are prevalent in those 
lights." Tr Vol. I, p. 15, L. 22 -p. 16, L. 2. His description of the colors that are emitted from a 
"sodium halide" lamp are inconsistent with his original description of a sodium halide lamp. 
First, he states it is a "multi-color. .. bright white light" and then he states it is multi-colored, 
specifically notating "the purples, the blues." Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 2-9; Id. He also makes this 
determination based upon seeing a small amount of light seeping through the perimeter of a non-
transparent window covering while driving by the premises on the evening of July fourth. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 15, L. 20 - p. 16 L. 3. Based upon that drive-by viewing of the seeping light, ISP 
Cagle makes a speculative and conclusory determination that he is viewing "sodium halide" 
lights even though his specific description of those lights does not match his description of those 
lights offered only minutes prior. 
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He expounded that there are usually multiple pots in a small room. Tr Vol. I, p. 4, L. 20; 
p. 19, L. 21. He informed that one could have several hundred plants in a small room and 
usually they are in different stages including smaller plants clear up to mature plants. Tr Vol. I, 
p. 4, L. 20-23. He explained that typically a grower will take mature plants and graft off of those 
plants or clone those plants so that there are constantly plants at different stages of growth. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 4, L. 23 -p. 5, L. l; p. 20, L. 1-7. No evidence is ever presented, however, that there 
were any potted plants in 11576, much less several hundred marijuana plants in different stages 
of growth. 
ISP Cagle also confirmed that marijuana grow operations incorporate common garden 
materials but in a much larger scale. Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 18-22. No evidence was presented that 
there were any garden materials at 11576 and certainly not in a much larger scale than a normal 
person would have at their home. 
ISP Cagle suggested that because they followed Appellant to the gardening sections of 
Zamzow's, Home Depot, and Lowe's where Appellant purchased nothing at any of those 
locations, that there is evidence of a grow operation. Tr Vol. I, p. 13, L. 1 - p. 14, L. 19. Not 
only is there no evidence of a marijuana grow, but there is not a shred of evidence that 11576 
contained any common garden materials, much less on a larger scale than normal. On the 
contrary, it is more likely that Appellant spent time in the fertilizer sections of those stores doing 
research to perpetuate his nicely kept green grass in his back yard as the heat of summer was just 
setting in. 
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ISP Cagle infonned that it is common in indoor marijuana grow operations to cover the 
windows so the light coming into and out of the growing environment is controlled. Tr Vol. I, p. 
10, L. 1-15. A non-transparent material is commonly employed to accomplish this goal. Id. The 
detective did observe that a window in the front of the house appeared to have a non-transparent 
material on the other side of closed blinds. Tr Vol. I, p. 9, L. 15-21. However, the fact that 
somebody utilizes a non-transparent material to cover a window does not amount to concrete 
evidence of criminal activity. It could be used to shield sunlight from a residence where daytime 
sleep is required by an individual's work schedule. It might also be utilized to shield sunlight 
from an entertainment room where a glare on a television screen would be annoying. It might 
also be utilized to shield sunlight from an indoor grow of tomato plants, peppers, and herbs since 
the occupant was a renter who is unlikely to be able to substantially alter the landscape of the 
residence to incorporate an outside garden. It might even be simply employed to enjoy a 
modicum of privacy. 
The detective also indicated that exhaust fans arc commonly used to dissipate odors, 
moisture, and heat from an indoor marijuana grow. Tr Vol. I, p. 10, L. 22 - p. 11, L. 2. ISP 
Cagle did notate that there were two (2) fans in the sliding glass door at the back of the house but 
failed to show any connection to a criminal purpose of those fans, i.e., to dissipate odors, 
moisture, or heat from a marijuana grow operation. Id. In fact, it is inconsistent that while ISP 
Cagle spends a good portion of time pointing to the non-transparent material covering the front 
room window, that he concludes the fans at the back of the house would be employed to 
dissipate, odors, moisture, and heat coming from a front room grow operation. ISP Cagle did, 
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however, indicate that these observations were made around the beginning of July when the 
weather historically gets warmer. Tr Vol. I, p. 12, L. 21-22. He also informed that the Appellant 
who resides there is a renter. Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 24. 
If there was a marijuana grow operation inside of the residence and the fans were being 
utilized to dissipate odors, then a reasonable person would presume that the Detective, a canine 
drug dog, or even possibly a neighbor would have detected the odor of marijuana. Without the 
presence of the odor of marijuana, the "usual inferences which reasonable men" would draw 
from this information would lead a "neutral and detached magistrate" to believe that as a renter 
who could not likely make substantial changes to the premises, Appellant incorporated a couple 
of fans into the back sliding glass door to regulate the heat during the summer day. Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. at 13-14, 68 S.Ct. at 369. 
ISP Cagle indicated that based upon his training that "it is not always common that 
people live in the residence where they grow their marijuana." Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 12-14. ISP 
Cagle pointed to a number of flyers and other things found at the front door to suggest the 
consistency in this case. Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 13-15. However, ISP Cagle also indicated in his 
first statement by the anonymous informant that the person at 115 7 6 "currently lived in [ and] had 
been there for approximately one (1) year." Tr Vol. I, p. 7, L. 9-11. 
Additionally inconsistent with the hypothesis that Appellant did not live there is ISP 
Cagle's testimony that Appellant was observed leaving the residence in his truck from inside a 
garage and returning to the garage where he backed into the garage and ISP Cagle noted that 
there was too much clutter in the garage to have parked more than one vehicle. Tr Vol. I, p. 12, 
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L. 21; p. 14, L. 14-19. The fact that Appellant was observed leaving the residence and then 
returning to the residence strongly suggests he resides at the residence. If he did not live there, 
he would more likely have been observed coming to the residence and then leaving the residence 
rather than vice versa. The fact that Appellant resided there is bolstered by the fact that he left 
and returned with no new purchase to implement into the home. If the home was used for a grow 
operation only, Appellant would not have ventured into three (3) home supply stores and 
returned with nothing. Also significant is that the garage was cluttered so as to leave only space 
for a single vehicle, again suggesting that Appellant lived there and did not utilize the space 
specifically for a grow operation as suggested by Detective Cagle. The evidence is inconsistent 
with ISP Cagle's training and experience with indoor marijuana grow operations. 
Taking all of ISP Cagle's extensive training and experience and the detailed picture of a 
marijuana grow operation that is painted before the comi, the evidence provided that is 
consistent with the picture painted is perfectly innocuous and far from substantial. Lacking in 
consistency are the following: 
A. There is no evidence of a watering system. 
B. There is no evidence of a regulated lighting system on a timer. 
C. There is no evidence of multiple pots in a small room, or even evidence of 
a single pot in any room. 
D. There is no evidence of common garden supplies used in a larger than 
normal scale, or even that any garden supplies were utilized at 11576. 
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E. There is no evidence of the fans being employed to dissipate odors, 
moisture, or heat from a marijuana grow operation. 
F. There is no evidence of marijuana!! 
All in all, the State has shown that a renter put fans in the back of his house and uses bright lights 
inside while covering a window. That evidence was cleverly presented against the background 
picture of a detailed marijuana grow operation that existed only in the minds of the prosecuting 
attorney and ISP Cagle. 
B. THE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OFFERED DID NOT MAKE UP FOR THE 
INCONSISTENCY IN THE EVIDENCE FOUND VERSUS WHAT IS 
EXPECTED TO BE FOUND AT A MARIJUANA GROW OPERATION. 
ISP Cagle suggested there is additional evidence that would point to a marijuana grow 
operation at 11576. He noted the lack of gardening space in the back yard, Appellant's criminal 
history out of Illinois, a laptop in Appellant's truck, and speculated as to the possibility of the 
presence of a generator. 
From his personal observation of Appellant's back yard, ISP Cagle noted that there was 
no gardening space in the back yard. Tr Vol. I, p. 9, L. 22-25. This is consistent with the 
detective's determination that Appellant is a renter, not with the possibility of an indoor 
marijuana grow operation. Since Appellant is a renter, he would normally not be allowed to 
make substantial changes to the landscaping of a rental property. The evidence of a lack of 
gardening space in the back yard might have been significant had there been evidence of a large 
amount of gardening supplies at the residence. There was, however, no evidence of any 
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gardening supplies at the residence making this piece of information of no value other than to 
suggest that Appellant is a renter who is compliant with the terms of his rental agreement. 
ISP Cagle offers evidence that Appellant has three (3) convictions for marijuana-type 
crimes out of Illinois. Tr Vol. L p. 12, 8-11. No other information is offered in regards to this 
criminal history. The State does not offer evidence of how long ago those charges took place, 
what the charges were, whether they occurred during his youth, what the age of the Appellant is 
now, or what the severity of punishment was implemented for the charges. The State merely 
suggested that Appellant's past marijuana-type convictions are evidence of current criminal 
activity despite the fact that prior criminal convictions do not even amount to reasonable 
suspicion unless coupled with more concrete evidence which is not supplied in the case at hand. 
Foster, 634 F.3d at 247. 
The detective discussed the presence of a computer in Appellant's truck and the fact that 
he spent about fifteen minutes on the computer after exiting Lowe's. Tr Vol. I, p. 14, L. 20 - p. 
15, L. 1 1. When asked to inform the Judge why he thought this was of import, ISP Cagle began 
his response with, "from discussing with everybody in the office ... " and goes on to speculate 
"he's probably price checking ... perhaps following a recipe ... perhaps didn't have the right 
name brands ... " and then back to "possibly price checking." Id. (emphasis added). The 
testimony offered here is entirely speculative and without basis. What we do know is that 
Appellant drives a pickup truck with pieces of PVC in the back and has a MDT type computer in 
the truck. Common sense dictates that it is likely that Appellant is a service technician of some 
sort who requires on the fly internet access or computing power to provide customers with the 
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best service available at the job site. Common sense would also dictate that if Appellant was 
going to price check, recipe check, or compare name brand products, he would have done so 
from the convenience and privacy of his home before going to the stores, rather than on the fly in 
the parking lot of Lowe's after already visiting the three (3) largest gardening supply stores in 
the vicinity. If he was price checking, he would have just completed that task manually. 
Likewise, there was testimony speculating as to the possible presence of a generator at 
the home. Tr Vol. I, p. 16, L. 25 - p. 18, L. 2. ISP Cagle did not offer that evidence from his 
own testimony, but was prompted by the prosecuting attorney through questioning. Id. ISP 
Cagle indicated that when at the front of the home he heard "a fan or some sort of motor running 
inside the house." Id. The PA asked if that could have been a generator, to which ISP Cagle 
dutifully responded, "[i]t's possible, yes." Id. (emphasis added). Then the PA asked if ISP 
Cagle had ever seen portable generators used in indoor marijuana grow operations, to which ISP 
Cagle informed that he had not, but had seen pictures of them being used for grow operations on 
the internet. Id. Going further, the PA inquired as to the alleged fuel tank in the back of the 
pickup and ISP Cagle expounded that it could be used to supply fuel to a generator. Id. Again, 
the evidence consisted entirely of speculation and amounts to nothing more than "the 
Government attempt[ing] to spin these largely mundane acts into a web of deception." Foster, 
643 F.3d at 249. 
A common sense analysis of the sound that ISP Cagle heard would be consistent with his 
original unprompted and instinctive statement that he heard a fan. He did indentify two (2) fans 
on the back sliding glass door and heard something inside the house that sounded like a fan. 
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Common sense would also suggest that if there were a generator running in the house, it would 
be significantly louder than a fan and would produce exhaust that would be detectible by smell or 
vision coming from the fans in the back of the residence. There is no solid evidence offered of a 
generator and even more importantly, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the house is 
powered other than by the power company. 
The additional evidence and speculation offered by the State in support of probable cause 
that a crime is being committed is not substantial. The lack of gardening space in the back yard 
shows Appellant is a compliant renter, his criminal history could be twenty years old and does 
not amount to even a reasonable suspicion, a MDT laptop in the truck suggests he is a service 
technician, and the sound ISP Cagle heard in the house was most likely the sound of the fans he 
identified at the back of the residence. "[A]n officer and the Government must do more than 
simply label a behavior as "suspicious" to make it so... even relying upon the "experience and 
specialized training" of the officer." Id. at 248, citing: United States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d at 343. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence offered in support of a search warrant and viewed as a whole does not 
amount to '·substantial evidence" or substantiate a "practical, common-sense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 
citing: Jones, 362 U.S. at 271. The evidence shows that a renter resides at 11576 and has for 
about one (1) year. There are two (2) fans in the back of the residence, a window covered on the 
inside, and the renter employs bright lights inside the home. Additionally, on one day he went to 
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the gardening seetions of Zamzows, Horne Depot, and Lowe's and left without purchasing 
anything. The evidence under the totality of the circumstances does not validate the abdication 
of the protection of the Fourth Amendment or Article I,§ 17 of the Idaho State Constitution and 
does not warrant "the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
ISP Cagle painted a detailed picture of what an indoor marijuana grow operation 
consisted of, but the evidence offered to suggest one existed at 11576 was inconsistent with his 
training and experience. There was no evidence of a watering system, an intricate and regulated 
lighting system, any pots of plants, much less multiple pots in different stages of gmwth, or any 
common garden materials, much less garden materials in a much larger scale than normally used. 
There was no evidence that the fans used in the back of the house were there to dissipate any 
odor. moisture, or heat from an indoor marijuana grow. In fact, there was no evidence of any 
marijuana odor coming from the residence at all. ISP Cagle informed that frequently people 
growing marijuana do not live at the residence, but there was ample evidence that Appellant had 
lived there for about a year and parked in a garage cluttered enough to make it possible to park 
only one vehicle. 
The additional evidence offered did not make up for the lack of consistency in the 
evidenee found versus what is expected to be found at a marijuana grow operation. ISP Cagle 
suggested that the lack of gardening space in the back yard, Appellant's criminal history out of 
Illinois, a laptop in his truck, and the speculative possibility of a generator in the house are 
additional and substantial pieces of evidence. Common sense however would suggest that a 
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renter cannot substantially modify the landscape of a rented residence, the non-specific criminal 
history does not even amount to a reasonable suspicion and could be two decades old and offer 
no value as to the character and practices of the Appellant today, a laptop in a truck merely 
suggests that he is a service technician, and the speculative possibility of a generator in the house 
is conjecture without adequate foundation or substantive implication. In fact, the sound heard by 
the officer in the home was identified by the officer as a fan until the PA suggested it might be a 
generator which would make considerably more noise than a fan and would put off a detectible 
amount of exhaust. 
The evidence presented was offered after a detailed portrayal of an indoor marijuana 
grow operation and then only lightly peppered with innocuous evidence that would be consistent 
with many other non-criminal propositions. Appellant could have been engaged in amateur film 
making, photography, or even had an art studio in his home for painting. Each of those activities 
would require bright lights, privacy, and adequate air ventilation. Even supposing the officer 
correctly identified the bright lights as growing lights, the evidence would only support the 
conclusion that Appellant was engaged in the perfectly legal endeavor of growing his own 
vegetable garden inside a rental residence where he did not have permission to alter the 
landscape for a garden. After all, in today's world where so many are concerned with processed 
foods, there is a significant movement of those who believe naturally grown food is a key to long 
life. 
The magistrate erroneously authorized a search warrant based upon the mere ratification 
of the general and bare conclusions of a competitive officer. The precedent set by the 
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magistrate's authorization will deteriorate the protections of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions to the point that every citizen could be subject to a search warrant when an officer 
who touts training and experience testifies that his innocent observations are consistent with 
criminal activity. This Court must "conscientiously review the sufficiency" of the evidence 
presented in order to continue to protect the cornerstone principle offered by the United States 
and Idaho Constitutions that citizens are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. at 239. ln this case. that requires the suppression of evidence 
discovered in violation of that right. and Appellant hereby respectfully requests this Court 
reverse the decision of the District Court and suppress all evidence that followed the violation of 
the Fourth Amendment and Constitution of the State of Idaho. Article L ~ 17. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMJTTED this 15th day of June, 2011 . 
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